Cessna 208 Safety Record

The flight crew's decision to continue the visual flight rules flight into deteriorating visibility and their failure to perform an immediate escape maneuver after entry into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). Contributing to the accident were (1) Hageland's allowance of routine use of the terrain inhibit switch for inhibiting the terrain awareness and warning system alerts and inadequate guidance for uninhibiting the alerts, which reduced the margin of safety, particularly in deteriorating visibility; (2) Hageland's inadequate crew resource management (CRM) training; (3) the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to ensure that Hageland's approved CRM training contained all the required elements of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 135.330; and (4) Hageland's CFIT avoidance ground training, which was not tailored to the company's operations and did not address current CFIT-avoidance technologies.

The pilot's decision to land the fully loaded parachutist drop airplane on a wet grass runway that had insufficient length for the landing in high temperature conditions, which resulted in a runway overrun, when a more suitable longer runway was available at a nearby airport.

A total loss of engine power due to a fatigue fracture of the fuel pressure line that connected the fuel control unit and the fuel flow transducer due to vibration as the result of a fatigue fracture of an associated support clamp. Contributing to the accident was the mechanic’s inadequate inspection of the fuel line support clamp during the previous replacement of the fuel line.

The air traffic controller's decision to clear an aircraft to land on a runway occupied by another aircraft that had previously been instructed to line up and wait. Contributing to the runway incursion was the failure of the air traffic controller to visually scan the landing surface prior to issuing a clearance to land and failure of the assisting controllers to monitor and assist the local controller with the developing situation.

An encounter with a wind gust during ground maneuvering and the captain’s improper flight control positioning to account for wind conditions, which resulted in the airplane being blown onto its left wing.

The fuel pump gear manufacturer’s allowance of set-up gears made from a nonconforming material to be put in the production inventory system, the installation of a nonconforming gear in the accident airplane’s production fuel pump, and the gear’s failure, which resulted in a loss of fuel flow to the engine and the subsequent loss of engine power.

The pilot's improper decision to continue the landing when the airplane was not in a safe position to land, resulting in the collision with ground-based approach lighting.

The ground service vehicle operator's failure to yield right of way to the airplane due to distraction, which necessitated the pilot's use of reverse thrust and braking to avoid a collision and resulted in the airplane's empennage striking the ground.

The pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed to compensate for icing on the airplane's wings and control surfaces during a circling approach, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain.

The check airman's delayed remedial action and initiation of a recovery procedure after a simulated pitch trim excursion, which resulted in a loss of airplane control.

The loss of engine power due to the fracture of multiple blades on the compressor turbine wheel, which resulted in a ditching. The reason for the blade failures could not be determined due to secondary thermal damage to the blades.