Cessna 208 Safety Record

The airport’s continued use of taxiway Kilo, despite an identified risk of pilots repeatedly failing to stop at a hold short line prior to two intersecting runways. Contributing were 1) the operator’s moving map display, which omitted a published restriction on the use of taxiway Kilo for widebody airplanes, 2) the Captain’s resulting inadvertent continuance through the hold-short line, and 3) the FAA’s delayed action to remediate the airport’s legacy design, which did not conform with current airport design standards. .

The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate altitude during a circling approach procedure in dark night visual meteorological conditions, which resulted in a collision with terrain.

The pilot’s inability to maintain control of the airplane when it encountered a microburst during a landing attempt and a go-around near known thunderstorm activity. Contributing to the accident was an inadequate amount of wind sensors and wind shear detection equipment used by the ATC tower to detect microburst activity at the airport.

The pilot’s failure to maintain directional control during takeoff which resulted in an impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s momentary distraction from conflicting boat traffic.

The right-seated pilot’s failure to correct the left-seated pilot’s mismanagement of the engine thrust, which resulted in undesired speed and thrust oscillations during the final approach and a subsequent descent into terrain.

The pilot’s failure to maintain altitude during an instrument approach, which resulted in a descent below the approach path and impact with a vent stack. Also causal was the failure of the processing plant to correctly paint the vent stacks, which had been determined by the FAA to be a hazard to navigation due to their proximity to the landing approach path. Contributing to the accident was the likely distraction/illusion/obscuration created by steam from the processing plant, which intermittently obscured the runway.

The failure of the pilot of the second aircraft to maintain a safe distance from the lead airplane while taxiing, which resulted in a ground collision.

The pilot’s fuel mismanagement, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion and subsequent impact with trees during a forced landing.

The pilot’s intentional inflight operation of the propeller in beta, which led to an aerodynamic lock, his inability to restore forward thrust, and subsequent collision with terrain.

The pilot’s unexpected encounter with supercooled liquid droplets (SLD), which resulted in a loss of control due to ice accumulation. Contributing to the accident were: (1) the pilot’s failure to maintain the minimum airspeed for flight in icing conditions, (2) the pilot’s failure to disconnect the autopilot every 10 minutes to check for ice buildup, (3) the overweight airplane, (4) the lack of an SLD forecast product for the state of Alaska, and (5) the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to require weight and balance documentation for each flight in Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 single-engine operations.