Bell 222 Safety Record

Failure of the air traffic controller to exercise positive control of the situation by issuing clear and timely control instructions to the helicopter pilot. Contributing to the incident was delay by the helicopter pilot in responding to instructions issued by the controller.

The fracture of a swashplate drive pin as a result of hydrogen embrittlement due to an unknown source, which resulted in an in-flight breakup of the main rotor system during cruise flight.

The pilot's inadequate preflight inspection to ensure that all tie-down straps were removed prior to flight. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's improper management of sleep opportunities during the preceding rest period, which likely contributed to the development of fatigue.

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from the 734-foot-tall lighted tower during the visual night flight due to inadequate preflight planning, insufficient altitude, and a flight route too low to clear the tower. Contributing to the accident was the air traffic controller's failure to issue a safety alert as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65, “Air Traffic Control.” Vice Chairman Hart did not approve this probable cause and filed a dissenting statement. The statement can be found in the public docket for this accident.

High winds forcing the helicopter's main rotor blade to strike the helicopter vertical stabilizer and tail boom during engine start, causing substantial damage.

The flight crew's failure to maintain control of the helicopter, and the crew's diverted attention to secondary tasks while preparing for the night landing. A contributing factor was the dark night conditions.

The failure of the pilot to maintain rotor rpm and his inadequate recovery from a bounced landing. Factors contributing to the accident included the tailwind condition and the tree.

The fatigue failure (fracture) of the right forward transmission lift link during cruise flight, which resulted in a severe vibration and an emergency landing.

The loss of clamp-up force between the transmission case and the pylon mounted actuator support assembly which resulted in fatigue failure of the threaded studs and dowel pins, the failure of the flight control system, helicopter control not being possible after the flight control failure, and the inadequate maintenance procedures by the company maintenance personnel.

The pilot's failure to ensure that both throttles were in the takeoff position. Factors were the pilot's decision to takeoff with a tailwind, and his lack of recurrent emergency procedure training in this helicopter.

The below standard (loose) fit of the 'white' swashplate outer ring pin resulting in fatigue and subsequent separation of the pin, and ultimately the in-flight breakup of the rotorcraft. A factor was the manufacturer's dissemination of the pin which did not meet dimensional standards.

The pilot's delayed initiation of a go-around when the severity of the dust condition first became apparent. Contributing factors were dark night conditions and the obscuration from the dust.

flight by the pilot into known adverse weather conditions, and his failure (or inability) to maintain sufficient clearance or altitude from mountainous terrain. Related factors were: darkness, heavy snow, high winds, the pilot's perception of pressure that was induced by the conditions and events, and mountainous terrain.