Sikorsky S-76 Safety Record

Fracture of the red tail rotor blade spar, which resulted in the separation and departure of the red tail rotor blade from the helicopter and subsequent compromised tail gearbox. The red tail rotor blade was not recovered, thus the cause of the initial fracture could not be determined.

The intermittent loss of engine power due to a "stuck" stepper motor in the No. 2 engine's fuel control as a result of an inadequate overhaul. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to continue flying the helicopter with a known defect, his decision to depart with the helicopter over its maximum gross weight, and his decision to fly the approach to the oil platform at a high gross weight in a direction that provided limited go-around potential.

(1) the sudden loss of power to both engines that resulted from impact with a bird (red-tailed hawk), which fractured the windshield and interfered with engine fuel controls, and (2) the subsequent disorientation of the flight crewmembers, which left them unable to recover from the loss of power. Contributing to the accident were (1) the lack of Federal Aviation Administration regulations and guidance, at the time the helicopter was certificated, requiring helicopter windshields to be resistant to bird strikes; (2) the lack of protections that would prevent the T handles from inadvertently dislodging out of their detents; and (3) the lack of a master warning light and audible system to alert the flight crew of a low-rotor-speed condition.

The failure of the flightcrew to stabilize the helicopter over its confined landing area during a hovering left-pedal turn, resulting in tail rotor blade contact with a perimeter fence component and a subsequent loss of directional control. Contributing to the accident was the inadequate markings of the heliport and heliport spots, and failure of FAA personnel to detect the inadequate heliport markings during inspection of the heliport approximately 1 month prior to the accident.

The copilot's misjudged clearance from an object during a hovering turn for landing. Contributing to the accident were the inadequately marked heliport surface and the close proximity of an obstruction near the landing area.

The flight crew's failure to maintain clearance with the water and their diverted attention to secondary tasks while preparing to land. Contributing factor were the low ceilings and the heavy rains restricting their visibility.

The failure by maintenance personnel to secure the tail rotor driveshaft cowling after performing maintenance which resulted in a loss of tail rotor control. A contributing factor was the pilot's improper preflight inspection of the tail rotor driveshaft area.

The pilot flying's failure to maintain adequate aft hover clearance from a fence, and the pilot in command's delayed remedial action. A factor was the dark night lighting conditions.

The lineman's failure to maintain adequate clearance from the main rotor system. A factor was his lack of familiarity with the accident helicopter make and model.

An inadvertent encounter with a left quartering tailwind. Factors in the accident were settling with power, the high gross weight of the helicopter, and the crew's failure to accurately assess the winds in the area.

The failure of the pilot to reduce the engine power control levers to ground idle prior to leaving the helicopter, resulting in the unmanned helicopter moving on the helipad and performing a dynamic rollover.

failure of the copilot to maintain a positive rate of climb after takeoff, which led to an inadvertent descent and collision with a crop of sugar cane and the ground. Factors relating to the accident were: darkness, fog, and the pilot-in-command's inadequate monitoring of the copilot, when he diverted his attention to adjusting the instrument lights.

the copilot's failure to maintain altitude and the pilot-in-command's inadequate supervision of the operation. Factors include the dark night and low ceiling, and the flightcrew's failure to set the proper altimeter setting.