Piper PA28R Safety Record

The inability of the pilot of the Piper and the student pilot and flight instructor of the Diamond to see and avoid the other airplane. Contributing to the collision was the Piper pilot’s failure to use the correct common traffic advisory frequency to announce his airplane's position.

The pilot receiving instruction's failure to extend the landing gear and the flight instructor's failure to ensure that the landing gear were extended during landing. Contributing to the accident was the pilot receiving instruction's and instructor's failure to conduct a prelanding checklist.

A partial loss of engine power due to inadequate thru-bolt and stud preload tension by undetermined maintenance personnel, which resulted in fretting between the engine crankcase halves, and the subsequent separation of the No. 2 cylinder due to the fatigue failure of the No. 2 cylinder stud/thru bolts.

Extensive fatigue cracking in the left-wing main spar lower cap and doublers, which resulted in the in-flight separation of the left wing. The fatigue cracks initiated and grew to a critical size due to flight and ground loads associated with flight-training involving flight-training maneuvers, significant operation at low altitudes and frequent landing cycles. Previously established inspection criteria were insufficient to detect the fatigue crack before it grew to a critical size.

The pilots' inadequate preflight inspection, which failed to ensure that the oil filler cap was secured and resulted in oil starvation and a total loss of engine power.

The pilot receiving instruction’s and flight instructor’s improper decision to enter a canyon surrounded by steep rising terrain and their subsequent failure to maintain clearance from terrain while maneuvering at a low altitude.

The loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined postaccident engine test-runs revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot’s failure to maintain a proper landing flare in variable wind conditions, which resulted in the airplane landing on the left edge of the runway and impacting trees.

Maintenance personnel’s incorrect installation of the No. 3 cylinder’s hydraulic valve tappet plunger, which resulted in a failure of the No. 3 cylinder’s intake valve and the subsequent partial loss of engine power.

The non-instrument-rated pilot's improper decision to continue visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in spatial disorientation and a loss of airplane control.

The pilot’s failure to attain a proper glidepath on approach for landing, which resulted in impact with trees. Contributing to the accident was a partial, temporary loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot receiving instruction's failure to maintain adequate airspeed and his exceedance of the airplane's critical angle-of-attack during a simulated engine failure and landing, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor's delayed remedial action.

A total loss of engine power during approach for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination did not reveal any evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot's improper decision to continue a takeoff with a partial loss of engine power that occurred early in the takeoff roll. The reason for the partial loss of engine power could not be determined because postaccident fire damage to the engine precluded an examination.