Mooney M20 Safety Record

THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO ATTAIN THE PROPER TOUCHDOWN POINT AND HIS DELAY IN INITIATING A GO-AROUND. OTHER RELATED FACTORS WERE THE RAIN AND THE WET RUNWAY.

THE PILOT-IN-COMMAND'S IMPROPER FLARE DURING A FORCED LANDING WHICH RESULTED IN A HARD LANDING. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE TOTAL LOSS OF ENGINE POWER FOR UNDETERMINED REASONS.

THE PILOT'S INADEQUATE IN-FLIGHT PLANNING WHICH RESULTED IN FUEL EXHAUSTION. FACTORS WERE FOG AND THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO USE AVAILABLE EN ROUTE WEATHER SOURCES.

FAILURE OF THE PILOT TO ATTAIN PROPER RUNWAY ALIGNMENT DURING LANDING. FACTORS RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE DARKNESS, A LACK OF RUNWAY LIGHTING ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE RUNWAY, AND THE PILOT'S LACK OF VISUAL QUES.

THE PILOT'S IMPROPER RECOVERY FROM A BOUNCED LANDING AND DELAYED GO-AROUND DECISION. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A FAILURE OF THE PILOT TO ATTAIN THE TOUCH-DOWN DURING A DOWN WIND LANDING.

THE PILOT'S DELAY IN EXECUTING A RECOVERY FROM THE BOUNCED LANDING AND HIS INADVERTENT STALL DURING THE INITIAL CLIMB AFTER AND LANDING WAS ABORTED. FACTORS WERE THE EXCESSIVE LANDING SPEED AND THE HIGH DENSITY ALTITUDE.

THE FAILURE OF THE PILOT TO MAINTAIN RUNWAY ALIGNMENT AND HIS LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL DURING TAKEOFF GROUND ROLL, RESULTING IN A SWERVE OFF THE 150 FT WIDE RUNWAY AND IMPACT WITH A FENCE. FACTORS RELATING TO THE ACCIDENT WERE THE LACK OF RUNWAY LIGHTS, THE DARK NIGHT LIGHT CONDITIONS, AND THE FENCE BESIDE THE RUNWAY.

THE SEPARATION OF THE SWAGE BETWEEN THE THROTTLE OUTER HOUSING AND THROTTLE CABLE RESULTING IN LOSS OF THROTTLE CONTROL AND THE ENGINE REDUCING TO IDLE POWER.

THE PILOTS IN COMMAND OF BOTH AIRCRAFT FAILURE TO MAINTAIN VIGILANCE AND SEE AND AVOID EACH OTHER RESULTING IN A MIDAIR COLLISION. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE LOCAL CONTROLLERS FAILURE TO ISSUE TRAFFIC ADVISORIES.

FAILURE TO MAINTAIN PROPER GLIDEPATH. A FACTOR RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT IS THE FAILURE TO PERFORM REMEDIAL ACTION, THE DARK NIGHT, AND THE SNOW SHOWER IN PROGRESS AT THE TIME.

THE OVERLOAD FAILURE OF THE #2 CYLINDER CONNECTING ROD. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NIGHT LIGHT CONDITIONS AND THE PILOT'S INABILITY TO REACH A SUITABLE LANDING AREA.

THE INADEQUATE PREPARATION OF THE PROPELLER DURING OVERHAUL. THE INSTALLATION OF AN IMPROPER PITCHED PROPELLER AND THE FATIGUE FAILURE OF THE PROPELLER BLADE EMANATING FROM CORROSION WERE FACTORS IN THE ACCIDENT.

THE PILOT'S MISJUDGMENT OF DISTANCE (RUNWAY REMAINING) AFTER THE AIRCRAFT TOUCHED DOWN AND/OR HIS FAILURE TO GO-AROUND WHEN THERE WAS STILL SUFFICIENT SPEED TO DO SO.

THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN VSO (MINIMUM CONTROLLABLE AIRSPEED) IN A LANDING CONFIGURATION. AN ASSOCIATED FACTOR IS THE PILOT'S INADEQUATE REMEDIAL ACTION.

THE LOSS OF ENGINE POWER DUE TO FATIGUE FRACTURE OF THE NUMBER 2 CYLINDER CONNECTING ROD. FACTORS RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: ROUGH AND UNEVEN TERRAIN AT THE ACCIDENT SITE AND THE LACK OF SUITABLE TERRAIN FOR FORCED LANDING.

THE FAILURE OF THE RUBBER/METAL COUPLING IN THE LANDING GEAR ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY, WHICH RESULTED IN THE INABILITY OF THE PILOT TO LOWER AND LOCK THE LANDING GEAR.

IMPROPER MAINTENANCE OF THE PROPELLER BLADE BY UNKNOWN PERSONS AND THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE BLADE IN FATIGUE DURING CRUISE FLIGHT. A FACTOR WAS: UNSUITABLE TERRAIN.