Mitsubishi MU-2B Safety Record

FAILURE OF THE PILOT TO MAINTAIN A PROPER CLIMB RATE AFTER TAKEOFF, AND HIS INADVERTENT ENTRY IN A DESCENDING SPIRAL, WHICH HE FAILED TO CORRECT. FACTORS RELATING TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: DARKNESS, AND THE PILOT BECOMING SPATIALLY DISORIENTED DURING THE INITIAL CLIMB WHILE ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN AN IFR CLEARANCE.

was improper emergency procedures by the pilot which resulted in the shutdown of an operative engine, following a power loss due to a failed torque sensor in the other engine, which resulted in a total power loss approach, landing, and overrun.

THE FATIGUE CRACKING AND FRACTURE OF THE PROPELLER HUB ARM. THE RESULTANT SEPARATION OF THE HUB ARM AND THE PROPELLER BLADE DAMAGED THE ENGINE, NACELLE, WING, AND FUSELAGE, THEREBY CAUSING SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION TO AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE AND CONTROL THAT MADE A SUCCESSFUL LANDING PROBLEMATIC. THE CAUSE OF THE PROPELLER HUB ARM FRACTURE WAS A REDUCTION IN THE FATIGUE STRENGTH OF THE MATERIAL BECAUSE OF MANUFACTURING AND TIME-RELATED FACTORS (DECARBURIZATION, RESIDUAL STRESS, CORROSION, MIXED MICROSTRUCTURE, AND MACHINING/SCORING MARKS) THAT REDUCED THE FATIGUE RESISTANCE OF THE MATERIAL, PROBABLY COMBINED WITH EXPOSURE TO HIGHER-THAN-NORMAL CYCLIC LOADS DURING OPERATION OF THE PROPELLER AT A CRITICAL VIBRATION FREQUENCY (REACTIONLESS MODE), WHICH WAS NOT APPROPRIATELY CONSIDERED DURING THE AIRPLANE/PROPELLER CERTIFICATION PROCESS.

FUEL STARVATION DUE TO IMPROPER REFUELING PROCEDURES BY THE FBO PERSONNEL, INADEQUATE PREFLIGHT BY THE PILOT, AND RESULTANT ICE IN THE FUEL, WHICH BLOCKED FUEL FLOW TO THE ENGINES. A FACTOR WAS THE LACK OF SUITABLE TERRAIN FOR A FORCED LANDING.

THE FAILURE OF THE PILOT TO EXERCISE ADEQUATE VFR DEPARTURE TERRAIN AVOIDANCE PROCEDURES, AND THE FAILURE OF THE CONTROLLER TO ISSUE A SAFETY ALERT TO THE PILOT. FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: THE PILOT'S LACK OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA, THE DARK NIGHT, AND THE MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN.

AN INADVERTENT STALL DURING AN INSTRUMENT APPROACH WITH THE AUTOPILOT ENGAGED. A FACTOR WAS: THE PILOT'S PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT FROM A PRESCRIPTION DRUG.

THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CONTROL OF THE AIRPLANE AFTER BECOMING SPATIALLY DISORIENTED. FACTORS RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: DARKNESS, LOW OVERCAST CLOUD CONDITION, THE PILOT'S DECISION TO CONTINUE VFR FLIGHT INTO INSTRUMENT METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS (IMC), WHICH RESULTED IN A NEAR COLLISION WITH ANOTHER AIRCRAFT, HIS SELF INDUCED PRESSURE AND DIVERSION OF ATTENTION, WHILE COPING WITH THE SITUATION THAT HE HAD ENCOUNTERED.

THE SHUTDOWN OF ONE ENGINE FOR UNDETERMINED REASONS, AND THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO MAINTAIN VMCA DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLIGHT. A FACTOR IN THE ACCIDENT WAS THE PILOT'S IMPROPER EMERGENCY PROCEDURE.

THE COMPANY/OPERATOR MANAGEMENT'S DECISION TO OPERATE THE AIRCRAFT WITH A KNOWN DEFICIENCY WITHOUT FURTHER MAINTENANCE, THE PILOT'S IMPROPER PLANNING/DECISION AND THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO ABORT THE TAKEOFF (WHILE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT RUNWAY REMAINING). FACTORS RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: LACK OF POWER IN THE RIGHT ENGINE, AND THE UNFAVORABLE METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS AT THE AIRPORT.

A PROPELLER BLADE FATIGUE FAILURE DUE TO IMPROPER OVERHAUL BY OTHER MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL NOT PERFORMING OVERHAUL IN ACCORDANCE WITH FACTORY SERVICE BULLETINS.

IMPROPER PLANNING/DECISION BY THE PILOT, WHICH RESULTED IN EXCESSIVE ACCUMMULATION OF STRUCTURAL ICING (ON THE AIRCRAFT'S WINGS, STABILIZERS, FUSELAGE, AND/OR ENGINE INLETS), AND HIS FAILURE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE AIRSPEED AND AIRCRAFT CONTROL. FACTORS RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: THE PILOT'S INADEQUATE WEATHER EVALUATION DUE TO LACK OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION AT THE AUTOMATED FLIGHT SERVICE STATION (AFSS), HIS FAILURE TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM OTHER WEATHER STATIONS (EITHER BEFORE TAKEOFF OR DURING THE FLIGHT), HIS LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THIS MAKE AND MODEL OF AIRCRAFT, AND ICING CONDITIONS AT CRUISE ALTITUDE.

FAILURE OF THE PILOT TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE AIRSPEED (VMC), WHICH RESULTED IN A LOSS OF AIRCRAFT CONTROL. A FACTOR RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WAS: FATIGUE FAILURE OF A COUPLING SHAFT IN THE #1 ENGINE, WHICH RESULTED IN LOSS OF POWER IN THAT ENGINE.

LOSS OF DIRECTIONAL CONTROL BY THE PILOT, DURING TAKEOFF GROUND RUN. CONTRIBUTING TO THIS ACCIDENT WERE A LOSS OF POWER ON THE LEFT ENGINE DUE TO SNOW INGESTION, HEAVY SNOW SHOWERS IN PROGRESS AND AN ICY, SNOW COVERED RUNWAY.

FAILURE OF THE OWNER/OPERATOR TO OBTAIN PROPER MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT. FACTORS RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: OPERATION OF THE AIRCRAFT BY THE PILOT WITHOUT A CURRENT ANNUAL INSPECTION (KNOWN DEFICIENCY), AN OIL LEAK IN THE LEFT ENGINE WHICH RESULTED IN OIL EXHAUSTION, AND AN UNDETERMINED PROPELLER CONTROL LINKAGE PROBLEM WITH THE RIGHT ENGINE.

FAILURE OF THE CREW OF BROCKWAY FLIGHT 993 TO SEE-AND-AVOID THE OTHER AIRCRAFT DUE TO THE FIRST OFFICER'S INADEQUATE VISUAL LOOKOUT & THE CAPTAIN'S INADEQUATE SUPERVISION. FACTORS RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: THE WEATHER CONDITION, AND THE GROUND CONTROLLER'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE A TRAFFIC ADVISORY TO ICARUS 60.

THE FAILURE OF THE PILOT TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CONTROL AND RUNWAY ALIGNMENT DURING THE LANDING ROLL. FACTORS RELATED TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: LIGHT CONDITIONS AT DAWN, SNOW AND ICE ON THE RUNWAY, AND THE RUNWAY LIGHTS.

FAILURE OF THE PILOT TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT, DUE TO SPATIAL DISORIENTATION, AT ABOUT THE TIME HE WAS CHANGING RADIO FREQUENCIES DURING AN IFR APPROACH.