Learjet 35 Safety Record

The captain’s failure to perform a go-around following an unstable approach while landing with a gusty tailwind, which resulted in the airplane touching down long on the wet runway with insufficient distance to stop. Contributing to the accident was the crew’s unawareness of the prevailing winds and first officer’s decision to not call a go-around.

The pilot flying's improper lateral bank control during a go-around in gusting wind conditions, which resulted in the left-wing tip tank striking the runway.

The pilot-in-command's (PIC) attempt to salvage an unstabilized visual approach, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall at low altitude. Contributing to the accident was the PIC's decision to allow an unapproved second-in-command to act as pilot flying, the PIC's inadequate and incomplete preflight planning, and the flight crew's lack of an approach briefing. Also contributing to the accident were Trans-Pacific Jets' lack of safety programs that would have enabled the company to identify and correct patterns of poor performance and procedural noncompliance and the Federal Aviation Administration's ineffective Safety Assurance System procedures, which failed to identify these company oversight deficiencies.

The accident investigation is under the jurisdiction and control of the German government. This report is for information purposes only and contains only information released by or obtained from the German government or German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation/Bundesstelle fuer Flugunfalluntersuchung (BFU). Further information pertaining to this accident may be obtained from: German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation Bundesstelle fuer Flugunfalluntersuchung (BFU) Hermann-Blenk Strasse 16 38108 Braunschweig Germany

The pilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane following an inflight deployment of the left engine thrust reverser. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's failure to perform the appropriate emergency procedures, the copilot's lack of qualification and capability to act as a required flight crewmember for the flight, and the inflight deployment of the left engine thrust reverser for reasons that could not be determined through postaccident investigation.

The captain's inadequate compensation for wind conditions during the landing flare/touchdown. Contributing to the accident were a crosswind and windshear.

The probable cause of this incident was the IAD tower local controller's failure to ensure that the runway was free of all known ground vehicles, equipment, and personnel before permitting a departing aircraft to start takeoff roll. Additionally, the controller did not comply with local directives prohibiting taxi into position and hold operations while tower positions were combined.