De Havilland Dhc Safety Record

The pilot's misjudgment of the airplane's speed/distance from a dock resulting in the airplane drifting into a wooden piling during a taxi from landing. A factor in the accident was the presence of a tidal current.

The pilot's improper flare resulting in a hard landing. Factors contributing to the accident were the quartering tailwind, and the inadvertent water loop.

The failure of a ground handler to follow company proceedure/directives, and his premature release of a mooring line. Factors associated with the accident were the congested operations area, and the operator's failure to provide adequate safe zones for the airplanes.

The pilot's selection of an unsuitable taxi area, which resulted in substantial damage to the left elevator when the tailwheel encountered a hole. A factor associated with the accident was rough/uneven terrain.

The pilot's failure to compensate for a crosswind while taxiing, resulting in the right wing striking the water. A contributing factor in the accident was the presence of a crosswind.

The in-flight separation of a propeller blade, which resulted in a forced landing to unsuitable terrain. A factor related to the accident was the plowed field.

Improper tension of the right control yoke chain; a worn right aileron spring tab hinge bearing; improper tension of the left aileron spring tab aft spring and worn contact stud; improper tension of the right aileron spring tab and a worn contact stud; a worn left aileron hinge bearing.

The pilot's inadequate compensation for gusty wind conditions. Factors associated with the accident were the pilot's inadequate weather evaluation, and wind gusts.

The instructor pilot's inadequate supervision of the flight. Factors in the accident were the dual student's selection of unsuitable terrain for landing, and the presence of a sand bar in the landing area.

A failure of the pilot to maintain adequate distance/clearance from a cement barricade while taxiing into a parking spot after landing. A factor was the presence of a barricade adjacent to the parking spot.

The failure of the number 5 engine bearing assembly followed by the disconnection of the P2.5/P3 switching valve to rear inlet case sealing air tube and the melting of the NL probe port (sealing tube) which allowed an oil fed fire beyond the constraints of the engine casing and into the engine nacelle. A contributing factor was the company's failure to follow several maintenance procedures within the maintenance manual after a previous oil loss event. A second factor was the omission of the PW120A engine from the airworthiness directive issued by the FAA which mandated the completion of Pratt & Whitney service bulletin 20914. The lack of inclusion of the PW120A engine in the AD resulted in the company’s correct interpretation that the service bulletin was not mandatory.

the loss of power to both engines for undetermined reasons during approach. Contributing factors were the pilot's failure to properly position the fuel selector in accordance with the landing checklist and the lack of suitable terrain for the forced landing.

A malfunction of the aircraft's fuel selector valve and subsequent fuel starvation. Factors included a short emergency landing area, a wet landing surface, and a fence.

The pilot's failure to maintain directional control during the takeoff run. A factor associated with the accident was the pilot's diverted attention while retracting the water rudders.

The failure of the flight crew to properly execute the emergency landing gear extension procedure in response to a landing gear unsafe cockpit indication.