Cessna Safety Record

The non-instrument-rated pilot's improper decisions to begin and to continue a flight under visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.

Controlled flight into terrain due to pilot spatial disorientation. Contributing to the accident was pilot fatigue, mode confusion related to the status of the autopilot, and negative learning transfer due to flight guidance panel and attitude indicator differences from the pilot's previous flight experience.

The non-instrument-rated pilot's decision to continue a night visual flight rules into instrument flight rules conditions, which resulted in spatial disorientation and a loss of airplane control. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to obtain an official weather briefing.

The non-instrument-rated pilot's intentional visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's established anti-authority attitude.

The loose fuel fitting on the combustion heater that leaked a lean fuel-air mixture into the nose baggage compartment. The mixture was most likely ignited by the combustion heater, blowing off the nose baggage compartment doors and starting an in-flight fire.

The pilot's loss of airplane control following an encounter with low level wind shear and turbulence during final approach for landing. Contributing to the loss of control was the pilot's decision to retract the wing flaps on final approach, which resulted in a sudden loss of lift.

The student pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack during a steep climbing turn following a touch-and-go landing, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall at too low of an altitude to recover.

The noninstrument-rated pilot's decision to depart on and continue a flight over mountainous terrain into forecast instrument metrological conditions, icing, and hazardous wind conditions that exceeded the airplanes performance capabilities and resulted in an uncontrolled descent and collision with terrain.

The flight crew's decision to continue the visual flight rules flight into deteriorating visibility and their failure to perform an immediate escape maneuver after entry into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). Contributing to the accident were (1) Hageland's allowance of routine use of the terrain inhibit switch for inhibiting the terrain awareness and warning system alerts and inadequate guidance for uninhibiting the alerts, which reduced the margin of safety, particularly in deteriorating visibility; (2) Hageland's inadequate crew resource management (CRM) training; (3) the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to ensure that Hageland's approved CRM training contained all the required elements of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations 135.330; and (4) Hageland's CFIT avoidance ground training, which was not tailored to the company's operations and did not address current CFIT-avoidance technologies.

The pilot/mechanic's failure to maintain airspeed following a loss of engine power, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall. Also causal was the pilot/mechanic's failure to service the engine with oil following maintenance, which resulted in the total loss of engine power.

The pilot's improper decision to execute a maneuvering approach at low altitude during night conditions, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.