Bombardier CL-600 Safety Record

The failure of the left landing gear to extend due to improper maintenance when the landing gear door was replaced. Contributing to the incident was the manufacturer's inadequate maintenance manual instructions.

the failure of the maintenance personnel to properly complete the installation, and the inspection personnel to conduct the proper functional test, of the left main landing gear uplock assembly.

The tug driver's failure to yield the right-of-way to the airplane prior to crossing the active taxiway as required by airport procedures, and his subsequent failure to maintain clearance with the airplane. A contributing factor was the presence of the tug on the taxiway at the time the airplane passed the service road intersection. Additional factors were the wet pavement and the night lighting conditions.

The pilots' decision to land at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC), Traverse City, Michigan, without performing a landing distance assessment, which was required by company policy because of runway contamination initially reported by TVC ground operations personnel and continuing reports of deteriorating weather and runway conditions during the approach. This poor decision-making likely reflected the effects of fatigue produced by a long, demanding duty day and, for the captain, the duties associated with check airman functions. Contributing to the accident were 1) the Federal Aviation Administration pilot flight and duty time regulations that permitted the pilots' long, demanding duty day and 2) the TVC operations supervisor's use of ambiguous and unspecific radio phraseology in providing runway braking information. The Safety Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/A_Acc1.htm. The Aircraft Accident Report number is NTSB/AAR-08-02.

the captain's failure to adequately compensate for the crosswind conditions, and his failure to maintain directional control during landing. Contributing factors include the captain's failure to land at the nearest suitable airport after an in-flight mechanical problem, the airport operation's failure to conduct runway friction tests and to issue NOTAMS in accordance with existing regulations, the crosswind, the snow-covered runway, the runway sign, and night conditions.

the pilots' failure to ensure the airplane was loaded within weight and balance limits and their attempt to takeoff with the center of gravity well forward of the forward takeoff limit, which prevented the airplane from rotating at the intended rotation speed. Contributing to the accident were: 1) PJM's conduct of charter flights (using PJM pilots and airplanes) without proper Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification and its failure to ensure that all for-hire flights were conducted in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135 requirements; 2) Darby Aviation's failure to maintain operational control over 14 CFR Part 135 flights being conducted under its certificate by PJM, which resulted in an environment conducive to the development of systemic patterns of flight crew performance deficiencies like those observed in this accident; 3) the failure of the Birmingham, Alabama, FAA Flight Standards District Office to provide adequate surveillance and oversight of operations conducted under Darby's Part 135 certificate; and 4) the FAA's tacit approval of arrangements such as that between Darby and PJM.

The failure of an air conditioning pack, which resulted in a haze filling the cabin. A contributing factor was the failure of the passenger to follow evacuation instructions.

The flightcrew's misjudged clearance from a parked airport vehicle while taxiing. A factor was the vehicle operator's improper decision to park within a taxiway safety area.

The copilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane during the landing and the captain's delay in initiating remedial action. Factors contributing to the accident were the low ceiling and low visibility due to fog, and the aircraft's deviation from expected performance due to airframe icing.