Bell 407 Safety Record

Both helicopter pilots’ failure to see and avoid the other helicopter on approach to the helipad. Contributing to the accident were the failure of N407GA’s pilot to follow flight arrival route guidelines, and the failure of N407MJ’s pilot to follow communications guidelines requiring him to report his position within a minimum of 5 miles from the helipad.

The pilot's failure to identify and arrest the helicopter's descent, which resulted in its impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the limited outside visual reference due to the dark night conditions.

The pilot's failure to maintain adequate clearance from the idling main rotor blade. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's failure to comply with the manufacturer's procedure for securing the helicopter.

The pilot's improper decision to depart under visual flight rules into night instrument meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident was the fog and the dark night conditions.

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance with a stationary object while maneuvering for landing. Contributing factors were the inadequate facilities available for landing, the pilot's lack of information regarding the landing area, and the operational status of the offshore platform.

The pilot's failure to maintain clearance from mountainous terrain. Contributing factors were the pilot's improper decision to take the direct route over mountainous terrain, the dark night conditions, and the pressure to complete the mission induced by the pilot as a result of the nature of the EMS mission.

The pilot's failure to maintain terrain clearance as a result of fog conditions. A contributing factor was inadequate weather and dispatch information relayed to the pilot.

The pilot's inadvertent encounter with adverse weather, which resulted in the pilot failing to maintain terrain clearance. Contributing factors were the dark night conditions, the pilot's inadequate preflight preparation and planning, and the pressure to complete the mission induced by the pilot as a result of the nature of the EMS mission.

The partial loss of engine power due to erratic fuel flow metering to the engine resulting from the single point failure of the PLA potentiometer in the hydro-mechanical fuel control unit. A contributing factor was the lack of suitable terrain to execute a forced landing.

The pilot's failure to maintain directional control of the helicopter during the hot refueling operation which resulted in the main rotor blades striking the passenger. A contributing factor was the high wind conditions.

The catastrophic failure of the engine resulting from 1st stage turbine wheel blade failure due to type 1 hot corrosion (sulfidation). Contributing factors were the pilot's failure to brief the passengers on emergency safety equipment (life raft), the pilot's failure to deploy the skid-mounted emergency float system during the autorotation, the high wind conditions, and rough sea state.

The pilot's inability to maintain adequate visual lookout due to the lighting conditions and his failure to follow company procedures for departure from a landing zone. Factors were dark night conditions, bright lights in the landing zone which prevented vision beyond the zone, and the power line existence was not available on charts to either the pilot or ground personnel.