Boeing 737 Safety Record

The LAX north ground controller's failure to properly coordinate with the tower local controller prior to providing taxi instructions that permitted an aircraft to cross an active runway while another aircraft was departing. **This report was modified on December 12, 2007.**

ATC - The incident occurred because the ground controller instructed COM5196 to cross runway 22, without approval from the local controller, resulting in a loss of separation with DAL1238 that was landing on the same runway.

This incident was caused by failure of the LC2 controller to comply with coordination procedures and runway separation standards. Contributing was the failure of LAS ATCT management to establish procedures requiring positive separation of aircraft operations on converging runways.

The snowplow driver's failure to follow procedures/directives by crossing an active runway without clearance, resulting in a runway incursion and near collision with an airplane during its landing roll.

the flight crew's failure to cross-check and verify that the airplane was on the correct runway before takeoff. Contributing to the incident was the flight crew's self-induced pressure to heed the takeoff clearance during a period of increased workload.

A complete failure and depressurization of both hydraulic systems due to two separate events: 1) the failure of a engine driven pump on the 'A' system, and 2) the fatigue fracture and failure of a hydraulic line on the 'B' system.

The pilot's inadvertent application of the left brakes at touchdown. Contributing to the incident was insufficient information in the quick reference handbook on the loss of touchdown protection with an inoperative anti-skid system.

The foreign object damage to the horizontal stabilizer during taxi as a result of improper airport maintenance by contract maintenance personnel. The aluminum plate was a factor.

The pilot's improper touchdown and recovery from a bounced landing. Factors to the accident were the operator's failure to provide sufficient information on the use of autothrottles and bounced landing recovery techniques, along with the Federal Aviation Administration's failure to require the inclusion of mixed-mode flight control guidance and bounced landing recovery techniques in operator pilot training programs and flight manuals.

the local controller's failure to monitor the operation and recognize a developing traffic conflict which resulted in a loss of separation between USA1251 and ComAir 5026. Contributing to the accident was the controller's incorrect prioritization of his workload.

The pushback tow driver not maintaining visual lookout for the wing walker's visual signal, and the driver not maintaining clearance from the vehicle during the pushback for taxi. Factors to the accident were the standing vehicle behind the airplane, the inadequate group/crew coordination for the pushback, and the lack of guidance in the company's manuals to stop the tow when visual lookout is not maintained.

the left wing walker's failure to maintain an adequate visual lookout. Contributing factors were his inadequate initial training, and the failure of other ground personnel to follow company procedures/directives.