Airbus A320 Safety Record

The probable cause of the engine failure and subsequent undercowl engine fire was due to the fatigue fracture of a high pressure turbine stage 2 disk blade retaining lug that released two blades which impacted the low pressure turbine case causing a fuel line to fracture spraying fuel on the hot engine cases where it ignited. During a machining operation of the disk lug, a tool mark was introduced that set up the area for fatigue cracks to initiate.

the captain's decision to reject the takeoff after the airplane had rotated. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew's failure to follow standard operating procedures by not verifying that the airplane's flight management computer was properly configured for takeoff and the captain's failure to perform the correct action in response to the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring alert.

the failure of the right main landing gear door retraction flexible hydraulic line in the Green hydraulic system, which led to prolonged operation of the power transfer unit and subsequent overheating and loss of pressure in the Yellow hydraulic system, resulting in the airplane's operation with only one hydraulic system. Contributing to the incident was the lack of incorporation of aircraft manufacturer service bulletins that describe procedures for aircraft modifications intended to prevent this occurrence.

The first officer’s inadvertent activation of the parking brake in flight, which led to the airplane abruptly stopping and all four of its main landing gear tires deflating, and his use of a nonstandard procedure to cancel the airplane's monitoring alert system.

The separation of both halves of the left engine fan cowl assembly due to improper latching and locking of the all the fan cowl latches. The cause of the improper latching and locking of the fan cowls was due to the failure of the mechanic to unstow and properly latch and lock the fan cowl latches after the engine maintenance had been completed, and the failure of the maintenance inspector to detect and identify the unlatched condition. Contributing the incident is the design of the fan cowl latch assembly that can provide a false latch condition when the latch is neither latched or locked. Also contributing incident is the lack of adequate Airbus and Jet Blue fan cowl latch inspection guidance to detect and identify an unlatched condition.

The flight crew's failure to monitor the airplane’s radio and instruments and the progress of the flight after becoming distracted by conversations and activities unrelated to the operation of the flight.

An inadvertent in-flight encounter with turbulence during approach. Contributing to the accident was the passengers' failure to follow the instructions of the illuminated seatbelt sign.

The vehicle operator's failure to follow the designated haul route to the construction site and his failure to adhere to airport driving procedures, which led to missed visual cues and lack of required communication prior to crossing the active runway. Contributing to the incident was the vehicle operator's distraction.

The first officer’s excessive pitch-up of the airplane while landing with a tailwind, which resulted in a tailstrike following a bounced landing. Contributing to the bounced landing were a high descent rate and excessive thrust resulting from the first officer’s delay in retarding the thrust levers to idle, thereby providing residual thrust and preventing spoiler deployment.